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Aid can be like a widow’s curse: it does not get
wasted by expending more of it, but attempts to
spare it can translate the curse into a Danaid jar
which can never be filled up.
(UNCTAD 2000: 3)
1 Introduction
Since the late 1980s, the donor community initiated a series of strategies aimed at
alleviating the burden of external debt on developing countries. The initial process
involved non-concessional flow rescheduling of debt payments due, resulting in a
transfer of the burden over time. This process was relatively costless for the creditors as
it implied no accounting loss. In contrast, debtors did not benefit from rescheduling and
their debt burden continued to increase. The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund since 1996
aims at reducing the present value of the debt stock for countries that meet specific
criteria. As of September 2002, a total of 27 countries have qualified for debt relief
under the HIPC Initiative, including 24 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). On
the debtor side, progress with the HIPC Initiative is constrained by the slow pace of
implementation of poverty-reducing programmes and other institutional bottlenecks. On
the creditor side, the programme is hindered by the slow speed of delivery of debt relief
and the fact that a number of non-Paris Club creditors have not yet committed to
providing debt relief.
As a development financing strategy, debt relief is not likely to have significant effects
unless other measures are taken to maintain—or even better—to increase the level of
conventional development financing towards low-income countries. An increase in aid
flows is the only way to help these countries to boost economic development and
overcome debt crisis and aid dependence. The UNCTAD (2000: 2) points out that ‘the
only feasible way to end aid dependence is to launch a massive aid programme and to
sustain rapid growth for a sufficiently long period so as to allow domestic savings and
external private flows to gradually replace official aid’. There is ample evidence that
shows that development assistance plays a net positive role in economic development,
given the appropriate institutional environment (Burnside and Dollar 2000) and even
independently of the institutional and policy environment (Hansen and Tarp 2001).1
The existing evidence indicates that the supply of ODA and grants by major donors has
declined since the 1990s.From 1990 to 2000, aid to SSA countries as a group declined
by 28 per cent, from US$ 18 billion to US$ 13 billion, or from US$ 34 to US$ 20 per
capita (World Development Indicators 1997 and 2002). While debt relief may help in
reducing the pressure of debt service on government budgets and on the balance of
payments, the net gains in resources from debt relief alone will not be enough to meet
the needs for development financing, especially given the fact that low-income
                                                
1 Hansen and Tarp (2001) discuss various issues related to the empirical analysis of the links between
aid and growth as well as the role of the policy environment for the effectiveness of aid. In particular,
they conclude that the claim by Burnside and Dollar (2000) that aid contributes to aid only in good
policy environments is not supported by the data.2
countries are unable to attract substantial amounts of other forms of external financing
such as private capital.
This study addresses the specific question of additionality of debt relief by examining
whether and to what extent debt relief has been accompanied by a decrease in the flow
of development aid, grants, and other forms of concenssional external financing. The
study examines the effects of both traditional debt forgiveness and debt relief under
the HIPC Initiative using data from both the donor side and the recipient side.2 From the
donor side, the paper investigates whether the supply of ODA has been negatively
affected by debt forgiveness and debt relief. The empirical question is whether and to
what extent donors reduced their disbursement of ODA and grants following debt relief
and debt forgiveness. In other words, does debt relief/forgiveness crowd out
conventional external development financing? From the recipient side, the empirical
question is whether and to what extent countries that have received debt
relief/forgiveness subsequently received less ODA and other forms of concessional
development financing. The advantage of the analysis from both the donor and recipient
sides is that it presents a thorough view of the interactions between debt
relief/forgiveness and conventional development financing by examining both the
supply and the allocation of development finance.
First, the paper examines the trend of the flows of development financing by focusing
on the post-1988 period for the effects of debt forgiveness and the 1997-2000 period for
the impact of the HIPC Initiative. Second, the study undertakes a series econometric
tests to examine the impact of debt relief and debt forgiveness on the flows of
development assistance from both the donor side and the recipient side.
The econometric results indicate that the supply of ODA declined in 1998-2000,
coinciding with the implementation of the HIPC Initiative. However, this downward
trend had started prior to 1996. Nonetheless, analysis from the recipient side indicates
that countries that received debt relief also received more ODA compared to those that
did not qualify for debt relief. The results suggest that the behaviour of donors was not
negatively affected by debt relief in terms of the total volume of ODA disbursements.
The econometric results also indicate that the debt forgiveness initiatives undertaken
especially since the 1988 ‘Toronto terms’ did not crowd out conventional ODA. While
the disbursement of ODA declined in this period, econometric analysis fails to establish
a direct causal relationship between this downward trend of ODA and debt forgiveness,
both in terms of the supply of ODA (on the donor side) and its allocation (on the
recipient side).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief history of
the debt relief initiative. The third section examines the trend of the supply of ODA and
other external development resources. The section highlights differences between
countries that have received debt relief and those that have not reached a decision point.
Section four presents the econometric methodology and discusses the empirical results.
Section five concludes with a summary of the findings and a discussion of some policy
implications.
                                                
2 See Daseking and Powell (1999), Easterly (1999), and Evans (1999) for an overview of the history of
and issues related to debt forgiveness and debt relief.3
2 Debt relief: a brief history
2.1 The debt build up and the debt crisis
During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, developing countries experienced an
unprecedented accumulation of external debt, which eventually resulted in a debt crisis
in the mid-1980s. The debt buildup can be attributed to several factors, which can be
categorized into push factors, pull factors, and external shocks. Push factors included
the excess supply of dollars resulting from the oil revenue booms of the 1970s, which
caused a rush to lending by oil exporters and their banks in the west as they sought to
get rid of the excess liquidity. This forced lending was also motivated by economic
interests of the creditor countries seeking to stimulate exports and protect their domestic
industry and employment. Push factors also included strategic and political motivations
for lending aimed at supporting client regimes in the third world in order to counteract
the expansion of rival superpowers.3
Pull factors of the debt buildup included the need of developing countries to borrow in
order to finance development programmes in the post-independence era. Further
borrowing was necessitated by the need for funds to maintain development projects
originally financed by borrowing. External borrowing also led to further borrowing
especially in countries led by corrupt and inept regimes that squandered borrowed funds
through embezzlement and capital flight. There is substantial evidence in the literature
that suggests a vicious cycle of borrowing leading to capital flight, which leads to
further borrowing (Boyce 1992, 1993; Ndikumana and Boyce 2002). Furthermore, the
myopic attitude of some government led to accumulation of debt as these government
discounted heavily the adverse effects of debt on future regimes and future generations
(Easterly 1999; Alesina and Tabellini 1989).
In addition to push and pull factors, a number of adverse external shocks also
accentuated the accumulation of external debt by weakening the fiscal situation and the
balance of payments. These include terms of trade shocks, world recessions that reduced
the demand for third world products, and droughts and political crises. The dependence
on a narrow range of export products also contributed to the vulnerability of the debtor
countries to external shocks.
2.2 Non-concessional flow rescheduling
In the early 1980s, it became clear that developing countries could not sustain their debt
burden and most of them faced insolvency problems. As a result, private creditors
reduced lending to limit their exposure. Official creditors responded by adopting non-
concessional flow rescheduling while bilateral agencies provided new lending aimed at
supporting adjustment programmes. Non-concessional flow rescheduling consists of an
agreement between Paris Club creditors and debtor countries whereby the former
accepts the delaying of the receipt of payments falling due and a rescheduling of these
payments over a given period.
                                                
3 Ndikumana and Boyce (1998) discuss evidence of politically motivated lending by the United States
and international financial institutions to the former Zaire under the client regime of Mobutu. External
borrowing was used to finance massive capital flight and left the country heavily indebted.4
Non-concessional flow rescheduling produced important benefits for debtors and
creditors. The process resulted in a reduction of annual debt service payments, allowing
debtors to finance adjustment programmes and reducing pressure on government
budgets. For creditors, flow rescheduling took away the pressure and need for
disbursing new direct development finance and proved to be less costly both financially
and politically.
Non-concessional flow rescheduling, however, had important negative effects on
debtors. Flow rescheduling leaves the present value of debt unchanged, which implies
no accounting loss for the creditor. In contrast, the process implies an increase in the
stock of debt over time. By the end of the 1980s, it was clear that non-concessional flow
rescheduling was causing debt overhang by accelerating the debt buildup, making the
debt burden unsustainable for many countries.4 New strategies for addressing the debt
crisis were called for in order to reduce the debt burden instead of simply delaying debt
payments.
2.3 Debt forgiveness and debt relief under the HIPC Initiative
A concerted effort of reducing the debt burden for developing countries was initiated in
April 1987 following a proposition by Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer of
the United Kingdom, who suggested that debt rescheduling by Paris Club creditors
should be at below market rates of interest. This was an important step beyond non-
concessional flow rescheduling as the proposed new strategy was explicitly aimed at
reducing the present value of debt outstanding. However, the major Paris Club creditors
could not agree on specific mechanisms for reducing the debt. Three propositions were
advanced. The United Kingdom proposed a reduction of the interest rate charged on
rescheduled loans. France proposed a reduction of the payments falling due by a half
while rescheduling the remainder of the debts at the appropriate market rate. The United
States opposed any reduction of the present value of debt and agreed only on increasing
the grace period without any accounting loss to creditors. At the Toronto G-7 summit in
1988, a compromise was reached, giving creditors a menu of the three options in what
came to be known as the ‘Toronto terms’.
Under the Toronto terms, 28 reschedulings were undertaken for 20 countries for an
estimated total of about US$ 6 billion (Daseking and Powell 1999). Despite this effort,
however, the stock of debt continued to accumulate and it became clear that more
needed to be done. In 1990, the United Kingdom proposed more aggressive measures
including a reduction of the present value of debt by 67 per cent. However, in 1991, the
Paris Club agreed to raise the degree of concessionality to only 50 per cent under what
became known as the ‘London terms’. The degree of concessionality was raised to 67
per cent in Naples at the 1994 Paris Club summit under the ‘Naples terms’.
                                                
4 Debt sustainability is gauged using various indicators of indebtedness (net present value of debt and
debt service) and the country’s ability to pay (exports revenue, national income, and government
revenue). For example, the thresholds for debt sustainability were set to 200-250 per cent for the net
present value of debt to exports ratio and 20-25 per cent for the total debt service to exports ratio
under the original HIPC Initiative. The thresholds were reduced to 150 per cent and 15-20 per cent,
respectively, under the enhanced HIPC Initiative.5
The debt forgiveness process that started in 1988 has gained some momentum over the
last decade. However, traditional debt forgiveness remains insufficient to alleviate the
debt problems of low-income countries. In contrast, the process implies very low costs
for the donors; the amount of debt forgiven represents a tiny fraction of the donors’
gross national incomes, generally less than 1 per cent (Development Assistance
Committee).
In an attempt to link debt forgiveness directly to poverty reduction, the World Bank in
conjunction with the IMF and other members of the donor community launched in 1996
a global response to the debt crisis, known as the HIPC Initiative. The objective of the
programme is to ‘eliminate debt as an obstacle to poverty reduction’ (Wolfenson 2001).
As of September 2002, 27 HIPCs had reached the decision point, receiving a total of
US$ 41.5 billion in debt service relief (Appendix Table).
However, the HIPC Initiative continues to face several challenges. On the debtor side,
the speed of implementation of the required conditions for meeting the decision point is
slower than expected due to delays in the preparation and implementation of poverty
reduction strategy papers (PRSP) and delays in completion of poverty reduction growth
facility (PRGF) reviews (see Development Committee 2002). The situation in conflict-
ridden countries poses a special challenge for meeting the criteria for debt relief as they
struggle to make the expected progress in achieving peace while their economies are
devastated by war.
On the creditor side, the main constraints are the slow speed in reaching agreements
with HIPCs and the delays in the actual delivery of debt relief (Development Committee
2002). The delays in delivery by regional entities such as regional development banks
and the European Union are especially problematic given that they contribute a large
share of multilateral lending. Moreover, several multilateral creditors and non-Paris club
creditors have not yet approved debt relief for any HIPCs. The efforts by the World
Bank and the IMF to increase creditor participation have been typically limited to moral
suasion and mediation between HIPCs and creditors. It is clear that a more aggressive
strategy is needed to accelerate the process of debt relief by enrolling all the creditors.
3 Additionality of debt relief: highlights from the data
The objective of the debt relief initiative is to allow poor countries to achieve higher
economic growth through availability of a larger volume of finance. To achieve this
objective, debt relief must be given in addition to—not as a substitute for—conventional
development aid, grants, and other concessional external loans. The first set of evidence
in this section consists of highlights from the data on the supply of ODA and grants by
major donor countries. The focus is on the debt forgiveness period (1989-2000) and the
debt relief period (1998-2000). Second, the section examines recipient data on the
allocation of ODA, grants, and development financing among developing countries. The
objective is to assess whether and to what extent countries that have received debt
relief/forgiveness received lower volumes of non-debt generating finance and
concessional lending during the debt relief/forgiveness period and compared to other
developing countries that have received less or no debt relief/forgiveness.6
3.1 Official development aid
The data indicate that the volume of official development aid flows to developing
countries as a group has declined since the 1990s. For example, aid to Sub-Saharan
African countries declined from US$ 17,906 in 1990 to US$ 13,453 in 2000 or from
US$ 34 to US$ 20 per capita (World Development Indicators 1997 and 2002). Figure 1
illustrates this negative trend of the supply of ODA for HIPCs. This trend raises
concerns with regard to the effectiveness of the debt relief initiative. Without substantial
volumes of aid and concenssional lending, it is impossible for low-income countries to
raise domestic savings and investment and overcome aid dependence and poverty.
Figure 1




















































Completion reached Decision point reached No decision7
Table 1
Aid per capita to HIPCs before and during debt forgiveness period (US$, average per period)
By decade Last 3 years
1970-79 1980-89 1990-2000 1998 1999 2000
(I) Completion point reached under enhanced framework
Bolivia 15.0 43.3 83.4 79.1 69.9 57.2
Burkina Faso 13.8 29.8 41.1 37.3 36.2 29.8
Mozambique 3.7 30.3 67.0 61.3 46.5 49.5
Tanzania 14.2 33.3 35.0 31.1 30.1 31.0
Uganda 2.8 15.2 37.1 30.8 27.3 36.9
Average for category (I) 11.0 31.3 48.4 42.6 38.2 39.3
(II) Decision point reached under enhanced framework
Benin 13.7 29.6 47.0 35.4 34.5 38.0
Cameroon 15.2 22.9 38.6 29.9 29.8 25.5
Chad 15.5 27.5 34.8 23.0 25.1 17.0
Ethiopia 3.1 11.3 15.7 10.8 10.2 10.8
Gambia 24.1 93.0 60.8 31.5 26.5 37.7
Ghana 8.3 23.4 36.8 38.1 32.3 31.6
Guinea 5.5 31.9 52.4 50.7 32.8 20.6
Guinea-Bissau 30.2 90.7 108.3 83.4 44.6 67.1
Guyana 22.7 47.4 164.7 123.6 105.2 142.3
Honduras 13.8 52.9 70.4 52.7 130.7 70.0
Madagascar 9.0 24.9 30.9 33.9 23.8 20.8
Malawi 11.6 28.3 50.8 43.9 44.2 43.2
Mali 16.2 43.5 44.8 33.6 33.5 33.2
Mauritania 70.4 114.4 103.9 68.8 84.9 79.5
Nicaragua 16.1 47.2 135.0 120.5 136.7 110.8
Niger 20.8 39.7 34.9 28.8 17.9 19.5
Rwanda 15.5 31.3 57.9 43.2 44.9 37.8
Sao Tome and Principe 52.9 149.6 362.7 199.6 189.8 236.3
Senegal 25.6 69.7 71.0 55.5 57.7 44.4
Sierra Leone 6.9 22.0 33.4 22.0 14.9 36.3
Zambia 17.1 50.6 92.5 36.1 63.1 78.8
Average for category (II) 10.7 28.5 41.3 31.9 33.1 30.4
(III) Decision point reached under original framework
Côte d'Ivoire 13.1 21.1 57.8 52.7 28.8 22.0
(IV) No decision point
Burundi 11.7 33.4 31.5 11.7 11.1 13.6
Central African Republic 18.9 50.7 47.1 33.3 32.0 20.4
Comoros na 120.6 81.3 66.5 39.4 33.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8.6 14.2 6.7 2.6 2.7 3.6
Congo, Rep. 31.7 51.3 71.4 23.1 48.3 10.8
Lao PDR 19.4 14.5 51.7 56.1 57.3 53.3
Liberia 16.5 45.1 39.8 24.5 30.9 21.7
Myanmar 3.6 8.7 2.6 1.5 1.7 2.2
Somalia 22.7 64.7 40.5 9.8 13.5 11.8
Sudan 11.9 37.5 14.9 7.0 8.0 7.2
Togo 20.8 42.0 39.3 30.2 16.3 15.4
Average for category (IV) 9.8 23.7 15.1 7.9 8.5 7.6
Source: Author’s calculations from World Development Indicators 2002.8
Among HIPCs, the decline in aid flows in the 1990s is particularly pronounced among
those that have not yet reached a decision point (Table 1 and Figure 2). In this group,
average aid per capita declined from US$ 24 in the 1980s to US$ 15 in the 1990s. Aid
per capita in 2000 is lower than in 1998 in half of the HIPCs. Debt relief is not likely to
be accompanied by a net increase in overall resources given the decline in aid and
considering the fact that low-income countries are unable to attract substantial volumes
of alternative external resources such as private capital flows.
3.2 Net transfers on debt and net flows of resources
Debt relief is expected to be followed by an increase in net inflows of external resources
due to a reduction in debt service payments. However, net transfers on debt for HIPCs
have declined steadily even during the debt rescheduling period after 1988 (Figure 3).
For many HIPCs, net transfer on debt is negative for several years.
The financial situation of HIPCs is even more precarious if we examine all the capital
accounts by taking into account all capital inflows and outflows. First, these countries
receive little private capital inflows, partly due to high investment risk.5 Second, these
countries also experience high levels of capital flight. Several studies indicate that a
large amount of capital continues to flee even from the countries referred to as severely
indebted low-income countries (SILIC). Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) find that the
group of SILICs in Sub-Saharan Africa  is a ‘net creditor’ to the rest of the world in the
sense that the amount of accumulated capital flight exceeds the stock of debt owed by
this group as a whole. Moreover, Ndikumana and Boyce (2002) find that a large fraction
of the capital flight from SSA is financed by external borrowing, a
Figure 3
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5 See Ndikumana (2002) for a discussion of private capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa.9
phenomenon referred to as ‘debt-fuelled’ capital flight (see also Boyce 1993).6 The
authors find that, on average, out of every dollar borrowed from abroad, as much as 70
cents are channelled back abroad as capital flight. Ndikumana and Boyce also find that
there is a tendency for capital flight to persist, possibly arising from habit formation and
contagion effects.
The evidence of a two-way causal relationship between external borrowing and capital
flight has important policy implications for debt relief and debt management (see
Ndikumana and Boyce 2002 for a detailed discussion). The phenomenon of debt-fuelled
capital flight implies a significant degree of responsibility on the part of creditors.
Knowingly or unknowingly, creditors continued to finance the export of private capital
from developing countries instead of financing development projects. For political and
strategic reasons, bilateral creditors often chose to continue disbursing loans despite the
existence of clear evidence of embezzlement of the borrowed funds (see Ndikumana
and Boyce 1998). The implication is that official lenders should share the responsibility
for the debt burden and the cost of debt-fuelled capital flight.
In such circumstances, debt relief should be seen not as a privilege for HIPCs but, to
some extent, as an obligation on the part of creditors. First, the latter have a moral
obligation to alleviate the adverse effects of external debt since part of the debt was
politically motivated. Second, it is morally questionable to put the burden of debt
service on the new regimes of debtor countries and their populations given that they
were not involved in making the borrowing decisions and that they did not benefit much
from the borrowed funds that were squandered by past rulers.
4 Econometric tests of additionality of debt relief and debt forgiveness
The econometric tests of additionality aim at investigating whether there is a negative
relation between debt relief or debt forgiveness on the one hand and the disbursement of
external development financing on the other hand. A negative relation implies crowding
out of external official development financing by debt relief and debt forgiveness.
4.1 Tests for additionality from the donor side
4.1.1 Data and methodology
The analysis is based on data for 22 donors for the period 1980-2000. The 1980 cut-off
point gives a maximum number of countries with consistent data on the relevant
variables. The complete sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and United States. However some countries are excluded from the
regressions due to missing data. Greece is excluded from all regressions due to missing
data on ODA and debt forgiveness.
                                                
6 Also see Ndikumana and Boyce (1998) for a case study of the links between external borrowing and
capital flight from former Zaire (renamed Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997) under the Mobutu
regime.10
4.1.2 Tests for additionality of debt relief
The first set of regressions is panel data and cross-sectional regressions over the period
1998-2000 relating the disbursement of ODA to the supply of debt relief under the
HIPC Initiative (Table 2, columns 1 and 2). To check for robustness of the coefficients,
alternative estimation methods are used: panel-data OLS, fixed-effects (or within)
estimation, and random-effects estimation. The results of regressions with fixed effects
and random effects are similar and only the OLS and random-effects estimates are
reported.
The second set of tests consists of regressions over the period 1980-2000 including a
dummy for the HIPC Initiative period 1998-2000 (Table 2, columns 3 and 4). These
regressions aim at examining the question of whether and to what extent the supply of
ODA was affected negatively by the implementation of the HIPC Initiative.
4.1.3 Tests for additionality of debt forgiveness
The test of additionality of debt forgiveness is based on panel data regressions over the
‘post-Toronto’ period 1989-2000 relating the disbursement of ODA to the volume of
debt forgiveness supplied by donors (Table 3).
4.1.4 Model specification
Given that there is no clear-cut theoretical basis for the specification of the model
relating the supply of official development financing to debt relief/forgiveness, the
regression equation in this study is built up by including potential regressors one by one
and discarding the ones that are systematically insignificant. However, debt relief and
debt forgiveness are retained regardless of statistical significance given that they are the
focus of the investigation. The following explanatory variables were explored:
Indicators of the capacity to supply ODA: per capita GDP, government consumption
(per cent of GDP), the current account balance (per cent of GDP), the fiscal budget
balance (per cent of GDP), and total exports (per cent of GDP). It is expected that a
higher per capita income, current account surplus, budget surplus, and exports are
positively related to the volume of debt relief/forgiveness. These indicators are
measures of the availability of resources to finance debt relief/forgiveness. Government
consumption, as a proxy of total government spending also is expected to be positively
related to debt relief/forgiveness.7 All things equal, governments with larger budgets
theoretically also have a higher capacity to absorb higher volumes of debt forgiveness.
Indicators of the ‘interest’ of donor countries in the developing world: arms exports as
per cent of total exports, arms imports as a percentage of total imports, net foreign direct
investment (per cent of GDP), and a dummy indicating whether the donor country was a
former colonizer. We would expect these indicators to be positively related to debt
relief/forgiveness. The decision to give debt relief/forgiveness is not entirely altruistic.
Donors often use development assistance to pursue their own political and strategic
goals. Empirical evidence shows that various donors behave differently but that in
general, aid giving is influenced by political alliances and colonial history (Alesina and
                                                
7 Government consumption is preferred to total government expenditures in this analysis because the
former is better reported (less missing observations).11
Dollar 2000) and other donor-specific considerations under the headings of ‘moral
vision’ (Lumsdaine 1993) or broad ‘strategic interests’ (Maizels and Nissanke 1984).8
Indicators of the donor’s political regime: a dummy indicating whether ‘the dominant
party in the legislative arm is of right-wing ideology’. The dummy equals if the
dominant party in the legislative arm of the government is of left wing or centre
ideology and 1 if it is of right-wing ideology. It is expected that right-wing governments
would be less inclined to forgive debt than left-wing governments.
The following explanatory variables are retained: per capita GDP, government
consumption, the current account balance, the ‘right-wing’ regime dummy, and the
colonial history dummy. In addition to these observed explanatory factors, the model
also accounts for unobserved country specific effects. The model can be summarized as
follows:
For debt relief:  it i t i t i
D
it RELIEF ODA ε υ α + + + = − − β X 1 , 1 , 1 (1)
For debt forgiveness:  it i t i t i
D
it FORGIV ODA ε υ β + + + = − − δ X 1 , 1 , 1 (2)
where 
D
it ODA  is the disbursement of ODA by the donor i in year t as a percentage of the
donor’s GDP, RELIEF is debt relief and FORGIV is debt forgiven by the donor as
percentage of the donor’s GDP, X is a vector of the explanatory factors described
above,  i υ  represents country specific effects, and ε  is a white-noise error term. An
alternative specification where FORGIV is entered contemporaneously yields similar
results as when its lag is used and a Hausman test for endogeneity indicates that the
differences between the coefficients in the two specifications are not systematic.9 In this
study the lagged values of debt forgiveness are used, which allows us to examine
whether current debt forgiveness crowds out future aid flows.
4.2 Regression results for debt relief
The results of regressions relating ODA to the volume of debt relief using OLS and
random-effects estimation methods suggest that the supply of debt relief has no
statistically significant effect on the disbursement of ODA (Table 2, columns 1 and 2).
These results suggest that donors that supplied more debt relief did not disburse less
ODA. There is, therefore, no statistical evidence of crowding out of ODA by debt relief.
The regression results with a time dummy for the HIPC Initiative period (=1 for
1998-2000) indicate that the supply of ODA was lower during this period (Table 2,
                                                
8 There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the links between creditors’ political interests and
debt forgiveness. For example, Neumayer (2002) finds that except for the United States military
interests, measures of creditors’ political interests affect neither the decision to forgive debt nor the
volume of debt forgiven.
9 Using the model including debt forgiveness, log of per capita income, government consumption and
the current account surplus, the Hausman test yields a t-statistic of 1.35 with a p-value of 0.93 when
the random-effects method is used and 1.8 with a p-value of 0.77 when the OLS method is used.12
columns 3 and 4). This result is consistent with the evidence in Figure 1 that indicates a
decline in ODA in the 1990s. These econometric results suggest that while the
disbursement of ODA by donors declined at the end of the 1990s, there is no statistical
support for a direct causal relationship between this decline in ODA and the volume of
debt relief supplied by donors.
Table 2
Impact of debt relief under the HIPC Initiative on the supply of ODA
1998-2000:
 with volume of debt relief
1980-2000:
with HIPC period dummy










































Observations 63 63 423 423
R2 0.59 0.64
Within R2 0.05 0.15
Between R2 0.58 0.69
Overall R2 0.57 0.62












Note: The dependent variable is official development aid or grants disbursed by DAC. Coefficient on
the constant term not reported for reason of space. The t-statistics (for OLS) and z-statistics (for
random-effects regressions) are given in parenthesis. Fixed-effects estimates not reported: the
Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the differences in fixed-effects and random-
effects coefficients are systematic (Chi2=1.08 with a p-value of 0.89).
(a Hausman test of random versus fixed effects specification: H0=difference in coefficients not
systematic.
4.3 Regression results for debt forgiveness
The regression results show no effect of debt forgiveness on the supply of ODA
(Table 3). The coefficient on debt forgiveness is statistically insignificant and this result
holds when alternative estimation methods are used (the OLS, fixed-effects, and
random-effects methods). The results suggest that the debt forgiveness process initiated
in 1988 did not have any direct effects on the volume of ODA disbursed by donors.13
Table 3
Supply of ODA and debt forgiveness (1989-2000)










































Within R2 0.19 0.08
Between R2 0.20 0.39
Overall R2 0.12 0.37




Chi2 for model (Prob>Chi2) 29.9
(0.000)
Chi2 for Hausman test (Prob>Chi2)
 (a 60.6
(0.000)
Notes: The dependent variable is official development aid disbursed by DAC (% of GDP). The coefficient
on the constant term is not reported for reason of space. The t-statistics are given in parenthesis.
(a  Hausman test of random vs. fixed effects specification: H0=difference in coefficients not
systematic.
4.2 Tests for additionality from the recipient side
4.2.1 Data and methodology
This section examines the links between debt relief and debt forgiveness on the one
hand and the inflows of external development financing in developing countries on the
other hand. This study focuses on official development aid and concessional loans. The
analysis is based on a sample of 111 developing countries for the period 1989-2000.
However, the number of countries included in the regressions varies depending on data
availability.
The analysis from the recipient side investigates the question of whether and to what
extent low-income countries received less conventional development financing
following debt relief and debt forgiveness. This analysis supplements the analysis from
the donor side by examining the allocation of external development financing among
aid recipients.14
4.2.2 Tests for additionality of debt relief
The tests for additionality of debt relief focus on the 1997-2000 period during which
countries started receiving debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. The analysis is based
on cross-sectional regressions including the volume of debt relief received (Table 4,
columns 1 and 2) or a dummy indicating whether a country received debt relief by the




j RELIEF EXTFIN ε + + α + α = γ Z 1 0  (3)
where 
R
j EXTFIN  is a measure of external financing received by the developing
country, specifically ODA, as a percentage of gross national income and concessional
loans as a percentage of total debt. The vector Z includes two categories of factors.10
The first category includes indicators of the recipient’s need for debt relief: per capita
income, the debt to GNP ratio, and the debt service to exports ratio. It is expected that
countries with lower income and higher indebtedness will benefit from more debt relief.
The second category of factors includes indicators of the macroeconomic policy
environment and the political climate. It is expected that countries that have established
a record of sound macroeconomic policy and a stable political environment will receive
more debt relief. The macroeconomic policy stance is proxied by the inflation rate while
the political environment is proxied by an index of political freedom combining indexes
of political rights and civil liberty from Freedom House.11 RELIEF is alternatively the
volume of debt relief received by a country (per cent of gross national income in ODA
regressions and per cent of total debt in regressions for concessional loans) or a dummy
for debt relief that equals 1 if the country received debt relief under the HIPC Initiative
by December 2000 and 0 otherwise.
4.2.3 Tests for additionality of debt forgiveness
The tests for additionality of debt forgiveness cover the 1989-2000 period where
developing countries received debt forgiveness under the various debt alleviation
schemes starting from the 1988 ‘Toronto terms’. The analysis is based on the following
empirical equation:
jt j t j t j
R
jt FORGIVE EXTFIN ε η α + + + = − − β Z 1 , 1 , 1 (4)
where 
R
j EXTFIN  is ODA (per cent of gross national income) and concessional loans
(per cent of total debt), FORGIVE is debt forgiveness received by the country (per cent
of gross national income or  per cent of total debt), vector Z includes the same factors as
                                                
10 See Neumayer (2002) for a detailed empirical analysis of the determinants of the allocation of debt
forgiveness.
11 The freedom index (FREEDOM) is computed as: FREEDOM = 14 – political rights – civil liberty.
The indexes of political rights and civil liberty range from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). With this
transformation, a higher value of the freedom index corresponds to a better political environment,
which makes it easier to interpret the regression coefficients on the FREEDOM variable.15
in equation (3),  j η  represents country-specific effects, and ε  is a white-noise error
term. The equation is estimated using OLS, fixed-effects, and random-effects estimation
methods.
4.3 Regression results for additionality of debt relief
The cross-sectional regression results show a positive relationship between the volume
of debt relief received on the one hand and the volume of ODA and concessional loans
on the other hand (Table 4). The results indicate that countries that qualified for debt
relief under the HIPC Initiative also received higher volumes of ODA and concessional
loans during the 1997-2000 period. The regression coefficients on the volume of debt
relief suggest that recipients of debt relief received about 9.6 cents of ODA and
23.8 cents of concessional loans in addition to each dollar of debt relief received. This
implies that these countries experienced a net increase in new external resources.
Table 4
Debt relief and development aid:
cross-sectional regressions with recipient data, 1997-2000
Regression with volume
of debt relief
Regressions with HIPC dummy



























































Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.73 0.57 0.61 0.57
Notes:  (a Debt relief is scaled as the dependent variable: by GNP for aid regressions and debt stock for
concessional loans regressions.
The dependent variable is indicated in the column headings: average aid/GNP and the ratio of
concessional loans to total debt (averaged over the 1997-2000 period). The t-statistics are given
in parenthesis. The constant term is not reported for reason of space. The debt relief dummy=1 if
the country has reached a decision point under the HIPC Initiative as of December 2000. The
1996 subscript on the explanatory variables indicates the value of the variable for 1996 (before
the regression sample), which alleviates simultaneity bias.16
4.4 Regression results for additionality of debt forgiveness
The regression results for the effects of debt forgiveness on ODA and concessional
loans vary depending on the estimation method that is being used (Table 5). While the
random-effects estimation results indicate a significant positive relation between debt
forgiveness and ODA, the relation is not statistically under the fixed-effects and the
OLS estimation methods. Note that the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the
differences between the random-effects coefficients and the fixed-effects coefficients
are not systematic. This implies that the hypothesis that the country-level effects are
adequately modelled by a random-effects model is not supported by the data in this
Table 5
Effects of debt forgiveness on ODA and concessional loans
Regressions with recipient data (1989-2000)
ODA (% of GNI) Concessional loans (% of debt stock)
Explanatory variables:
























































































Observations 1066 1066 1066 1068 1068 1068
R2 0.46 0.49
Within R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
Between R2 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.47
Overall R2 0.39 0.44 0.39 0.44


















Notes: (a  Debt forgiven is scaled by gross national income (GNI) in ODA regressions and by debt
stock in regressions for concessional loans.
(b Hausman test of random vs. fixed effects specification: H0=difference in coefficients not
systematic.
The dependent variable is official development aid/GNP. The coefficient on the constant
term is not reported for reason of space. The t-statistics are given in parenthesis.17
particular specification of the model.12 The results imply that the allocation of ODA
among developing countries was not affected by debt forgiveness. In other words,
countries that received debt forgiveness did not receive less (or more) ODA relative to
those that did not or in subsequent years following debt forgiveness. The results also
show that concenssional lending was not affected by debt forgiveness. Developing
countries that benefited from debt forgiveness did not receive less concessional loans
following debt forgiveness or relative to those that did not receive or received less debt
forgiveness.
In summary, the analysis from the recipient side shows no statistical evidence for
crowding out of external development financing by debt forgiveness. The findings from
the donor side discussed earlier and these results from the recipient side imply that debt
forgiveness affected neither the disbursement of development assistance by donors nor
the allocation of aid among recipients.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The debt forgiveness initiative that has been under way for over a decade has proven
insufficient to resolve the debt problem of low-income countries. Even among recipients
of debt relief, net transfers on debt have continued to decline. This implies that much
more needs to be done to alleviate the debt burden and increase external development
financing.
The evidence examined in this study indicates that the supply of ODA and grants
declined in the 1990s. This downward trend of official development financing is also
observed using recipient data. The flow of development aid towards HIPCs as well as
towards all developing countries has declined since the 1990s. However, econometric
analysis indicates no direct causal link between the volume of debt relief/forgiveness
awarded and the volume of official development financing disbursed.
The decline in official development assistance to low-income countries raises serious
concerns with regard to the effectiveness of the debt relief effort. The reduction in
official development aid ultimately jeopardizes the purpose of debt relief because
resource constraints will retard economic growth and perpetuate the dependence on
external funding. Without a substantial increase in aid and other sources of low-cost
external financing, the effects of debt relief on government budgets and the balance of
payments are likely to be small and short lived. The gains from debt relief alone will not
be enough to meet the financing needs of low-income countries and the shortage of
external resources will continue to prevent the increase in domestic saving and
investment that is necessary to overcome aid dependence.
Debt relief can be used to promote economic and institutional reform and enhance
economic performance both among recipients of debt relief and among countries that
have not yet qualified for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. However, this will
require concerted efforts by the donor community aimed at helping to transform debt
relief recipients into true economic success stories. Increasing external assistance and
                                                
12 Obviously this result is conditional to this particular specification of the model.  The random-effects
specification might be appropriate in some alternative model of ODA allocation.18
using debt relief as a reward for performance in economic policy reform can serve as a
motivation for countries that are lagging behind, inducing them to undertake economic
reform programmes. Thus, debt relief can be used at both ends of the economic reform
process, inducing economic reform as well as rewarding performance in economic
reform.
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Appendix Table A1














































663 17.3 4.9 0.7 421.8 61.3











1,160 11.4 4.0 0.9 927.8 198.1











984 23.6 6.8 0.7 506.1 55.4
Decision point reached under enhanced framework (n=20)
Benin Jul. 00 Floating 460 31 976 12.6 3.2 0.9 263.4 74.4
Cameroon Oct. 00 Floating 2,000 27 6,250 20.5 10.6 3.5 337.5 111.6
Chad May 01 Floating 260 30 587 9.3 3.6 0.7 394.3 79.9
Ethiopia Nov. 01 Floating 1,930 47 3,260 13.9 5.3 0.8 548.0 86.6
Gambia Dec. 00 Floating 90 27 265 6.9 2.5 1.6 176.1 113.4
Ghana Feb. 02 Floating 3,700 56 3,920 19.2 6.4 3.1 271.6 132.2
Guinea Dec. 00 Floating 800 32 2,340 15.3 6.5 1.9 389.4 115.6


















Honduras Jul. 00 Floating 900 18 3,110 19.3 6.4 3.3 183.5 94.7
Madagascar Dec. 00 Floating 1,500 40 2,990 7.7 3.1 1.0 388.4 123.6











1,340 12.1 3.4 1.2 367.7 130.8
Nicaragua Dec. 00 Floating 4,500 72 5,550 23.0 8.3 5.2 538.3 332.6
Appendix Table A1 continues
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Decision point reached under enhanced framework (n=20)
Niger Dec. 00 Floating 900 54 1,040 9.4 3.4 0.6 534.6 89.0
Rwanda Dec. 00 Floating 800 71 722 24.7 7.8 0.6 896.2 71.6
Sao Tome and
Principe
De. 00 Floating 200 83 196 31.7 15.1 4.8 2,273.2 726.1
Senegal Jun. 00 Floating 850 19 2,420 14.4 4.7 1.7 213.4 78.7
Sierra Leone Mar. 02 Floating 950 80 792 48.0 11.0 1.6 1,434.7 206.6
Zambia Dec. 00 Floating 3,850 63 5,000 18.7 8.9 3.1 578.1 205.3
Decision point reached under original framework (n=1)
Côte d'Ivoire Mar. 98 — 800 6 11,538 22.4 11.8 6.3 266.8 140.9
Countries still to be considered (n=11)
Burundi 644 37.2 13.5 1.2 1910.9 163.3
Central African
Republic
543 12.9 3.8 0.6 556.4 91.6












Congo, Rep. 4,600 1.6 1.4 1.7 179.7 219.0
Lao PDR na na 1.9 0.6 484.1 149.6
Liberia na na na na na na
Myanmar 4,340 4.7 0.9 na 327.6 na
Somalia 2,270 na na na na na
Sudan 14,800 3.2 0.1 0.0 829.8 161.4
Togo 1,020 6.1 2.1 0.9 294.7 120.1
Total debt relief 415,200
Note: 
(a  DRC: preliminary HIPC paper issued and expecting $9.8 billion in debt relief .
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2002; IMF and World Bank HIPC decision and completion documents.
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